

making for a buried lead, to wit, his arguments concerning when the architecture of disclosure may support democratic goals and where instead it might threaten them.

In neo-liberal democracies, Marichal argues, where the liberal consumerist self is already all-important, the architecture of disclosure adds little to the well-entrenched politics of identity. I can “like” any number of just political causes and my network of intimates will legitimate this political performance by “liking” it (and therefore me) back. The pitfall is that this political act, cast as an identity performance, risks an over personalization that will fail to connect to the “impersonal structural forces” (p. 14) that underpin any just political cause. I “like” the lone warrior combating inner city poverty but what I really need to do is *act* to confront the structural violence that entails that poverty.

In contrast, Marichal submits that in totalitarian states this same architecture of disclosure may actually liberate the self and allow for otherwise impossible break-through mobilizations: “While Facebook’s encouragement of a ‘retreat to the personal’ might be a problem in Western democracies, it is exactly what’s needed in totalitarian regimes where ‘problematizing the self’ might be an important corrective to regimes that do not regard ‘the self’ as important. The architecture of revelation might be a problem unique to liberal societies” (p. 126).

Yet I am not so sanguine. While liberating the self is no doubt fundamental in a non-liberal society, I am not convinced that the architecture of disclosure allows users to break through self-ingrained communitarian politics to actually arrive at a free self. Indeed, Facebook’s very connection of intimates may drive users not towards the self but instead back to communitarian identity. We hope that Facebook will liberate the self in order to ultimately allow for instrumental and policy-relevant action. But all too often it instead seems to encourage the user to further align with their communitarian order and its underlying (and often self-destructive) identity politics. I don’t properly react against those in political power that are failing to govern because I am a Christian from the South, or a Kikuyu not a Luo, or a Sunni not a Shia. Identity politics further trumps instrumental politics and the connections and disclosures of Facebook play right into that.

Now for a few nitpicks. The book is poorly edited to the point of distraction. Case in point: “Facebook is primarily a world fueled by which feelings and emotions” (p. 66). What? In one paragraph on page 125 I desired a follow-up on two of the citations; I then turned to the bibliography in the back only to discover both references absent.

Marichal routinely references a study he undertook of 250 politically oriented Facebook groups. While he calls upon the study when it suits his purpose, we are left mostly to speculate as to exactly the methods and overall results of the research. His most significant overview

reads: “Throughout 2011, I conducted a content analysis of 250 politically oriented Facebook groups. Using *Google Translate*, I examined Facebook groups from 32 different countries in 23 different languages” (p 13). I am a stickler for methods so I wonder: What was his sampling approach, his coding method—what are the overall results? I am otherwise left to my darkest worry: that he has cherry picked from the study when it conveniences his argument and has otherwise ignored everything else.

The above notwithstanding, the good in *Facebook Democracy* far outweighs the bad and there is much to appreciate about this text. Additional sections of the book detail other fascinating ways that Facebook intersects with the political. For instance, Marichal gives a nice treatment of some aspects of the Arab Spring, there is a full chapter attending to privacy, and more.

Marichal helps us understand that Facebook relates to democracy in different ways and in different contexts due to definitive design decisions that this corporation has made in its own interest. If I am to remain at all optimistic, it is only that I believe Facebook need not be the social media platform for all people and all time. If the architecture of disclosure represents specific engineering choices made for specific corporate purpose, then why can’t we instead create “an architecture of democracy” that serves the public purpose? *Facebook Democracy* does not contemplate this architecture of democracy, let alone tell us how to design it. But it leaves me seeing no other choice but for citizens to collectively begin the processes of building one. The alternative is indeed a threat to public life.

The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality.

By Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 328p. \$99.00 cloth, \$31.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592714002618

— Alexander Reisenbichler, *George Washington University*

In their book, Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank pose two important questions: What explains variation in the organization of business interests across advanced economies? And what are the effects of that variation? *The Political Construction of Business Interests* explores the origins of business associations and their effects on larger developments in advanced industrialized countries when it comes to the welfare state, labor markets, and income inequality. Contrary to the widespread belief that business inherently opposes social programs, the authors offer a fresh perspective on why there is business support for the welfare state in some countries but not in others. In so doing, the book makes a significant and timely contribution to political economy research on the origins and effects of different forms of capitalism.

The authors provide two central arguments, both of which are supported with rich historical and statistical evidence in a multimethod research design. The first half of the book (Chaps. 2–6) explains the political origins of business associations during the late nineteenth century. The argument is straightforward: two-party systems are likely to produce *pluralist*, loosely organized employers' associations (e.g., the UK and the United States), whereas multiparty systems are likely to create highly coordinated employers' associations: *sectoral* associations in federalist polities (e.g., Germany) and *macrocorporatist* associations in centralized polities (e.g., Denmark). This is because in two-party systems, political leaders of both parties can promote the interests of business through legislative channels, with no need to delegate authority to business associations. In multiparty systems, however, employers are often represented in business parties that are unlikely to win parliamentary majorities. This induces right-of-center leaders to delegate authority to centralized business associations outside the legislative arena, largely for political reasons. The meat of the book is in the thorough comparative historical analysis of Denmark, Germany, the UK, and the United States that illustrates this argument. The authors then seek to demonstrate (in Chap. 7) that the same logic also sustained these differences in employer organization throughout the late twentieth century. In support, they provide statistical evidence for the association between party systems and the degree of business organization.

The second half of the book (Chaps. 8–12) examines the feedback effects of business organization on employers' preferences toward active labor market and social policies, and on income equality. In short, where the degree of business organization is high, the results are greater business support for egalitarian policies and higher income equality. *Macrocorporatist* economies, in particular, induce employers to favor encompassing policies, often in cooperation with labor and the state, due to i) the ability of employers to act collectively in shaping public policies and collective bargaining (e.g., skills development); and ii) the diffusion of social partnership norms through employers' associations. In *pluralist* economies, in contrast, employers lack collective-action capacities and traditions of social partnership, resulting in lower business support for egalitarian policies and in higher income inequality. *Sectoral* coordination, they argue, results in dual labor markets and modest income inequality, with highly protected and well-paid insiders and less well-protected outsiders. Interviews with Danish and British firms provide striking evidence that reveal the microfoundations of employers' preferences and how these preferences translate into socioeconomic outcomes.

The book advances our understanding of political economy in a number of ways. It fills existing gaps in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) framework about the

political construction and origins of coordinated and liberal economies. By championing electoral politics in explaining the organization of business interests, it brings political processes back into an otherwise apolitical VoC framework. The analysis also reveals why there is significant, and often overlooked, variation in corporatist structures *among* coordinated economies. Concomitantly, existing research has often neglected the variation in business attitudes toward public policies, given the predominant focus on labor in explaining welfare state outcomes. What distinguishes this book from previous research is that it spells out the conditions under which employers are more or less likely to promote egalitarian policies and social partnership in pursuit of their own interest. Finally, the book is an excellent example of historical institutionalist research. It offers a robust research design that explores big questions about the origins and feedback effects of business organization, supported by rich, comparative, historical case studies, including extensive archival and interview research, as well as quantitative tools.

Martin and Swank leave open some areas for future research. First, they do not explore the variation in country size. This raises the question of whether parts of their argument can be explained by a “small state” logic, in which small open economies have an incentive to develop corporatist structures and egalitarian policies, in order to protect workers from global market risks. Denmark, a small state, and Germany, acting like one, fit into this category. The size and positioning of states in the global economy, including in the European Union, might therefore deserve more attention in explaining business organization and welfare state outcomes. Second, the authors make a strong case for the socioeconomic superiority of the macrocorporatist “Danish model.” At the same time, they criticize German-style sectoral corporatism by claiming that it would result in dual labor markets and failures of coordination, a system “ill-equipped to address these [postindustrial] pressures” (p. 209). While some scholars agree with this gloomy characterization of the German model, others admire it for producing continued economic success and low unemployment, as well as highly competitive industries that benefit from *sectoral* and, increasingly, *firm-level* coordination. Third, the authors often find statistical support for the power resources of labor. Organized labor is thus an essential part of the equation when it comes to explaining business organization and preferences, welfare state policies, and collective bargaining; but this is less developed in both theory and case studies.

Finally, some might take issue with the relatively strong forms of path dependence found in the book. Business preferences, for instance, remain somewhat static in the analysis, without much room for temporal variation *within* countries—moving either toward or away from social investments in response to political and economic

challenges, such as shifting labor or party power. Similarly, the book promises an explanation for the reproduction of—and creeping changes in—business organization throughout the late twentieth century, exploring “the mechanisms by which institutions are reworked” (p. 22). Instead of developing these mechanisms, however, the authors reason that “[t]he structure of party competition affects the incentives of state actors today as it did a hundred years past [in that] political leaders seek social partners’ aide to manage the transition to postindustrial production” (p. 129). The authors could have done more to fill in the gaps to explain how exactly this occurred. As a result, the book is more persuasive in explaining *cross-national* variation in business organization and preferences than *over-time* resilience or change.

In conclusion, Martin and Swank favor coordinated structures over pluralist ones, which, in their view, improve income inequality and skills development in advanced economies. Although policymakers continue to preach austerity and structural reforms, they could learn a great deal from this important book—that social investment and partnership can foster competitiveness, productivity, and prosperity. However, given the specific institutional context from which macrocorporatism emerged, and by which it has been sustained, the book also provides answers as to why countries might have a hard time emulating the Danish model.

Ethnic Minority Migrants in Britain and France: Integration Trade-Offs. By Rahsaan Maxwell. Cambridge:

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— Deborah J. Milly, *Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University*

As liberal democracies struggle to understand the potential for minority ethnic groups holding very different belief systems to become incorporated into mainstream society, this book illuminates complex dynamics of political integration that will cause scholars and practitioners to rethink their expectations. Rahsaan Maxwell asks why some migrants of non-European origin are better integrated than others. Although it is hardly surprising that integration paths of migrant groups of different origins would vary, the treatment of this question introduces timely theoretical insights on the factors that facilitate minority migrant integration. The study employs data on national and local political representation to compare integration outcomes across migrant groups within countries as well as across countries. But *Ethnic Minority Migrants in Britain and France* is not only about political integration: The analysis disaggregates the experience of integration in a way that spans social science disciplines and demonstrates how social segregation, by facilitating

coethnic social networks, paradoxically may contribute to political and economic integration.

Maxwell seeks to explain why migrants to Britain and France who arrived socially better integrated have lost that advantage over time compared to less socially integrated ethnic minority groups. In comparing integration outcomes across groups of ethnic minority migrants in both countries, the author, rather than treating integration as a single phenomenon, evaluates social, economic, and political dimensions of integration separately to consider the relationship *among* these forms of integration for different groups. Social integration is assessed in terms of linguistic fluency, shared cultural and religious practices, intermarriage rates, and dispersed residential patterns; the absence of these characteristics is taken to be segregation. The measure of economic integration uses indicators of socioeconomic status, and that of political integration combines the proportion of elected officials who are coethnics, political participation, and access to political resources (p. 13). This approach to integration leads to the observation that more socially integrated groups appear to be less or no better integrated economically and politically than other groups. The explanation for this counterintuitive outcome stresses a positive side of segregation.

Maxwell’s argument hinges on the role of social segregation in promoting coethnic ties that enhance the capacity for group mobilization; conversely, social integration limits and weakens those ties. The “integration trade-off” refers to socially integrated groups’ lack of group-mobilization capacity and consequent disadvantages in seeking political or economic integration. Contrasting experiences among Caribbean, Indian, and Bangladeshi/Pakistani immigrant communities in Britain and among Caribbean and Maghrebian migrants in France provide evidence for this trade-off. (Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are treated as a single group for historical reasons.) Maxwell shows that in both countries, Caribbean immigrants, who were more socially integrated and had better employment opportunities on arrival due to centuries-long colonial legacies, have been less politically integrated than the other ethnic groups studied and that their early economic advantages have faded (pp. 35–36).

Chapters 3 and 4 address in depth the integration trade-off concerning economic success, highlighting how coethnic networks have had a differential effect, but the chapters on political integration give the book its greatest force. These use meticulous research to support the claim that the deficit of coethnic networks entailed by social integration poses obstacles to political integration. Chapter 5 treats the political representation of the ethnic minority groups studied, and Chapters 6 and 7 present in-depth local case studies of immigrant mobilization, with one chapter for Britain and one for France. The data on local electoral outcomes are especially noteworthy. The author assembled data for a sampling of local councils where